Mitch Lim

My Notes Part 1 -

 

• EFFECT & APPLICATIONS OF LAWS

  Civil Code of the Philippines (Art.1)

 

RULING OF THE COURT:

The decision by the Appellate Court was confirmed being that it was found at the defendant’s own testimony that Chan Lin, three (3) days after the delivery has been made by Sandoval’s driver, returned the amount of Php. 5600.00; and that the defendant claimed to have then returned the obtained 170 cavans of rice to Sandoval. The driver however, disputed the latter claim thus, the purpose of the law suit filed against at. Having been repaid by Chan Lin, the defendant had been stripped off on any claim to the cavans of rice. The defendant had unjustly enriched himself by purposely holding on to a property he no longer has claim to without a valid reason. The CA recognized that SANDOVAL is entitled to recover the rice or the value thereof due to him as the rightful owner.

 

DOCTRINE: Divorce  by Foreigners

VAN DORN VS ROMILLO JR

139 SCRA 139

 

Nationality Principle – Divorce

FACTS:

Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.

 

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

 

HELD:

 Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

 

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

TENCHAVEZ VS ESCANO 15 SCRA 355

 

Tenchavez vs Escano

TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano

CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

 

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares.  The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry.  A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying.  Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents.  However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage.  Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

 

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.  She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu.  Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children.  She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.  Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

 

RULING:

No. divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is NOT valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

 

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce.  Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.  Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.  The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.  In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married.  A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines.  Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

 

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Divorce obtained by foreigners VAN DORN VS ROMILLO JR

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS – law of the place of  the ceremony

Divorce between Two Filipinos Abroad

Thus, we have the Philippine-United States Military Bases Agreement, dated Mar. 14, 1947

Conflict of Laws (Arts. 15-18)

Nationality Principle (Art.15)

 

Examples are the immunities granted to diplomatic officials and visiting heads of states

Secondly, the presence of treaty stipulations.

 

Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.

(1) Theories of Territoriality and Generality

We adhere in the Philippines to that doctrine in criminal law known as the theory of territoriality; i.e., any offense committed within our territory offends the state. Therefore any person, whether citizen or alien, can be punished for committing a crime here. Thus, the technical term generality came into being;

it means that even aliens, male or female come under our territorial jurisdiction. This is because aliens owe some sort of allegiance even if it be temporary.

(2) Exceptions

Firstly, the principles of public international law.

National marketing corporation V Tecson

GR no. L-2013127 August 1969

Facts:

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,

MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,

THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.

 

December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation (NAMARCOM) filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years ago (December 21, 1955) for the revival of the judgement rendered.

If we will use the 365 days per year it will end up/prescribed on the December 19, 1965, since 1960 and 1964 were leap year.

Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of  jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of action. The court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code. However, National Marketing Corporationappealed to the court of appeals from such order. Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964 is a leap year,they insisted that a year means a calendar year and a leap year would still be counted as 1 year even if it consists of 366 days. The case reached its conclusion with the appellants theory with regards to the article 13 of the civil code.

Issues:

Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.

Ruling:

The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through legislative process and not by judicial decree.

Applicability of Penal Laws (Art. 14)

DOCTRINE:

The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear.  The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days.  When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each.

The phrase “Not more than 21 years of age” means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It does not mean 21 years or more or fraction of a year because that would be more than 21-365 –day cycle ”Not more than years old” is not equivalent to “Less than 22 years old” contrary to the petitioners claim. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.

 

FACTS:

- On March 16, 1996, petitioner (Lynette Garvida )applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that she being then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.

- On April 2, she filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter” where the same was granted before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) These decision were appealed before the RTC of Bangui but the presiding judge inhibited himself due to his closeness with Garvida.

- Garvida thereafter filed for her certificate of candidacy for the position of SK Chairman of the said Barangay. Her candidacy however opposed by her rival, respondent Florencio Sales Jr., on the ground that petitioner is over the age limit. Nonetheless, petitioner won the election on May 6, 1996 garnering 78 votes against 76 of the respondent.

-Petitioner Garvida argued that Section 3[b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991.She contends that the Code itself does not provide the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on Election day. She urges that so long as she didi not turn 22 years of age on election day, thus qualified as voter and member to file her candidacy.

 

Issue :

WON petitioner is qualified to file her candidacy in accordancy with the provision of the Local Government Code of 1991.

RULING:

No. Petitioner is not qualified.

The Provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his/her election is very clear according to the Supreme Court. The SC held that the Local Government Code speaks of years, it is understood that years are 365 days. The phrase “Not more than 21 years of age” means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It does not mean 21 years or more or fraction of a year because that would be more than 21-365 –day cycle/”Not more than years old” is not equivalent to “Less than 22 years old” contrary to the petitioners claim.The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.

 

NATIONAL MARKETING CORP VS TECSON 29 SCRA 70

 

Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

GARVIDA VS SALES 271 SCRA 767

Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals

258 SCRA 492

 

FACTS OF THE CASE:

 

Sometimes in December 1987, the petitioner, Regelio Mendiola entered into an agreement with certain Norma S. Nora for a business venture exporting prawns. It was upon the suggestion of Ms. Nora that they secure financing from Philippine National Bank (PNB) which will be secured by collaterals consisting of two real estate properties of the petitioner situated in Marikina and covered by Transfer Certificate Title of Title No. 27307 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Marikina. The petitioner issued a Special Power of Attorney to Ms. Nora on January 27, 1988 authorizing her to mortgage his property to the PNB. This authorization is to secure the obligations of the joint venture to the said bank amounting to five million pesos (Php 5,000,000.00). However, the joint venture did not prosper since the beginning. But Ms. Nora has already obtained from PNB on the strength of the Special Power of Attorney issued by the petitioner amounting to Php 8,101,440.62 for the account of the petitioner and secured by the parcels of land mentioned before.

 

On November 11, 1988, the petitioner belatedly revoked his Special Power of Attorney issued to Ms. Norma and requested the Philippine National Bank to release his properties from the mortgage executed by Ms. Nora. The request notwithstanding, petitioner was notified under a Notice of Sheriff Sale dated April 20, 1989, that a foreclosure was initiated by PNB against the properties of the petitioner.

 

On May 16, 1989, the petitioner filed a case for injunction against the PNB, docketed as Civil Case No. 58173, with Branch 162, Regional Trial Court in Pasig City, seeking to enjoin the foreclosure the properties in question. PNB filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the complainant did not state a sufficient cause of action, which after hearing the trial court, was granted and the complaint was ordered dismissed without pronouncement as to cost. The temporary restraining order under the date of May 16, 1989 was lifted and set aside also. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the said Order on November 16, 1989. While the Civil Case 58173 was pending with the Court, the properties were sold in auction sale on October 3, 1990, with PNB as the highest bidder acquired the same.

 

On October 10, the petitioner filed an action to annul the said October 3, 1990 auction docketed as Civil Case No. 60012. PNB likewise file filed a motion to dismiss the same alleging that there is a pending case between the same parties for the same cause of action which the petitioner opposed the same motion to dismiss. On February 28, 1991, after hearing the trial, the motion filed by PNB was granted to dismiss Civil Case No. 60012 on the ground of litis pendentia[AML6] . The Order denied the injunction and the instant case was dismissed with prejudiced, without cause. Again, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied. Petitioner appealed before the court who rendered the decision dated November 1995 in CA-GR. CV No. 37940, affirming the Orders in toto[AML7] , with cost against the plaintiff-appellant.

 

ISSUES:

 

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming in toto the Order dated February 28, 1991 based on the Order dated August 17, 1989 considering the latter that the Order simply resolved that the mortgage in favor of the PNB is binding upon petitioner but has not resolved the decretal potion of such latter order whether PNB has the right to foreclose such mortgage based on the defaulted obligations of Ms. Norma S. Nora, and it has not likewise resolved in the decretal portion thereof whether such defaulted obligations of Norma Nora are secured by the mortgage in favor of the PNB; and assuming for the sake of argument that res judicata has set in, its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality?

 

HELD:

 

No, because the instant case becomes moot and academic when the first case docketed as Civil Case No. 58173, which is an application of injunction filed by the petitioner before the trial court against private respondent Philippine National Bank to prevent the bank from foreclosing his real properties, and which was then a pending appeal before the court a quo at the time the second civil action was filed, has been finally dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29601 whereby the said appeal was ‘declared abandoned and is dismissed pursuant to Section 1 (d) of the Rules of Court. Also, the instant petition which prays declaration of nullity of the auction sale becomes dismissible under the principle of res judicata. This simply means that the petition was bar by prior judgment which is referred to as ‘conclusiveness of judgment’ under Section 49 of the Revised Rule of Court. The Court explained that ‘there is res judicata, when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. When the three identities are present, the judgment of the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have offered for that for purpose.’ Also, the Court pointed out that equity, which is a ‘justice outside legality’ is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.

 

Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced[AML8] .

 

Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

 

People vs. Amigo

252 SCRA 43

 

Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

 

FACTS OF THE CASE:

 

Initially, the accused-appellant, Patricio Amigo, was charged with FRUSTRATED MURDER when on or about December 29, 1989, the accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with the said weapon certain Benito Ng Suy in Bajada, Davao, City. The latter suffered multiple wounds (13 stabs) and was hospitalized for three weeks at San Pedro General Hospital with a little chance of surviving. In order to save his life, she was air-lifted to Manila to be treated at Chinese General Hospital but expired after three (3) weeks of hospitalization due to sepsis or severe infection. Upon the death of Benito, amended information was filed charging the accused with MURDER. The Court sentenced Amigo with reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the bereaved for actual, compensatory, and moral damages. The accused-appellant questioned the decision of the Court and contended that he must not be sentenced with reclusion perpetua since the 1987 Constitution is already in effect during the commission of the crime and the promulgation of Republic Act No. 7656 which abolished the death penalty. The accused-appellant reasoned out that the penalty for the crime, without modifying circumstances should be reclusion temporal in its medium period.

 

ISSUE:

 

Whether or not the Court erred in imposing reclusion perpetua [AML3] to the accused instead of reclusion temporal?[AML4] 

 

HELD:

 

No. Because there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the offenses in which the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by the law under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court applies the principle of dura lex sid lex which simply means that the duty of the Court is to apply the law and it can never serve as forum to sympathize with the accused. Should the law be too harsh for the accused, the law itself provide remedies. But the modification of the law cannot be made by the Court unless the legislature repeal or modify the same.

Penalties as per Revised Penal Code of the Philippines

 

Type

Entire length

 

Minimum length

 

Medium length

 

Maximum length

 

Accessory penalties

 

Min

Max

Min

Max

Min

Max

Min

Max

 

Reclusión perpetua

30 years

 

Civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and perpetual absolute disqualification

Reclusion temporal

12 years and one day

20 years

12 years and one day

14 years and 8 months

14 years and 8 months

17 years and 4 months

17 years and 4 months

20 years

 

Prision mayorand temporary disqualification

6 years and one day

12 years

6 years and 1 day

8 years

8 years and 1 day

10 years

10 years and 1 day

12 years

 

• If disqualification is imposed, 12 years and 1 day

• Temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage

 

The lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. Since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.

Yes, should a greater amount of damages be decreed in favor of herein petitioners, the payments already made to them pursuant to the workmen's compensation act shall be deducted. Presumption & Applicability of Custom (Art 10-12)

PEOPLE VS AMIGO 252 SCRA 43[AML2] 

 

Held:

 

Yes , the Court of First Instance have jurisdiction over the complaint.

Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

 

FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING CORPORATION 136 SCRA136 [AML1] 

 

Case: Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corp. 136 SCRA 142

 

Facts:

 

Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex  Mining Corporation's mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act (WCA).

Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection. The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the CFI of Manila.

Philex filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the  action was based on an industrial accident, which is covered under WCA, and therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case.

Philex argues that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA.

 

Philex further contends that the WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer was negligent.

 

The heirs, however, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence.

The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.

 

Issue:

Whether or not the CFI (Court of First Instance) have jurisdiction over the complaint? Whether or not the heirs still can recover compensation damages aside from the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA)

 

Doctrine of Stare Decisis

 

In the Philippines, we adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis (let it stand, et non quieta movere) for reasons of stability in the law. The doctrine, which is really “adherence to precedents,” states that once a case has been decided one way, then another case, involving exactly the same point at issue,should be decided in the same manner.

 

Of course, when a case has been decided erroneously, such an error must not be perpetuated by blind obedience to the doctrine of stare decisis. No matter how sound a doctrine may be, and no matter how long it has been followed thru the years, still if found to be contrary to law, it must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis does not and should not apply when there is a confl ict between the precedent and the law. (Tan Chong v. Sec. of Labor, 79 Phil. 249).

 

While stability in the law is eminently to be desired, idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More pregnant than anything else is that the court shall be right. (Phil. Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30)

Duty to Render Judgement (Art.9)

Caltex v. Palomar

GR L-19650, 29 September 1966 (18 SCRA 247)

Facts:

In 1960, Caltex (Phils) Inc. conceived a promotional scheme “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” calculated to drum up patronage for its products, calling for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid. Neither a purchase of Caltex products is required. Entry forms were available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can was provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails, not only as amongst the mediator publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, in view of sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. Such overtures were formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated 31 October 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General Enrico Palomar opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance.

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against the Postmaster General, praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public. The trial court ruled that the contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the Postmaster General has no right to bar the public distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The Postmaster General appealed to the Supreme Court.

 Issue(s):

• Whether construction should be employed in the case.

• Whether the contest is a lottery or a gift enterprise that violates the provisions of the Postal Law.

 Held:

Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.

 

“Lottery” extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. “Gift enterprise,” on the other hand, is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Further, consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, the term under construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the “gift enterprise” therein included. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute ‘lottery’, if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. Thus, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. In the present case, there is no requirement in the rules that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate; for the scheme to be deemed a lottery. Neither is there is a sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser for the scheme to be deemed a gift enterprise. The scheme is merely a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment, without costs.

 

Stare Decisis

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

 

CALTEX INC. VS PALOMAR 18 SCRA 247

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

Sources of Law

In general, the sources of law are given in this Article, and in the order of preference, they are: the Constitution, laws (or presidential decrees), administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations.

Judicial Decisions (Art.8)

  

Repeal of Laws (Art.7)

 Rights- is the legally force to claim something from another

Waiver- relinguish the right

Procedural right can be waived

Substantive right(basis of right under the law) -cannot be waived

Due process-right to be heard

What are the requisites of a valid waiver? (Art. 6) (CUE- CF)

C = Full capacity to make a waiver

U = Must be unequivocal

E = Must exist at the time being waived

C = Must not be contrary to public law, public policy, good customs, prejudicial to a third person

F = When formalities are required, the same must be complied with.

 

What are the exceptions to waive a right? (C-PEN)

 

C = Waiver is contrary to law

P = Waiver is prejudicial to a third person without a right recognized by law.

E = Alleged rights which really do not exist yet

N = If a right is a natural right

CONSUNJI VS CA ,SUPRA

What are the laws that allow execution against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws? (Art. 5) PAVE

P = Law that makes the act valid but punishes the violator

A = Authorizes its validity

V = Law that makes the act voidable

E = Recognizes the validity of the act but recognizes its effects as legally existing

For example

Waiver of Rights (Art.6)

Requisites of valid waiver

FACTS

• Ortigas & Co. (Ortigas) sold to Emilia Hermoso (Hermoso) a parcel of land, with the condition that only a single-family residential building shall be erected on the same.

• A few years later, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) issued a zoning ordinance which  effectively reclassified the land bought by Hermoso from “residential” to “commercial.”

• Hermoso leased the land to Ismael Mathay III (Mathay). Mathay constructed a single-storey commercial building on the land.Ortigas sued Hermoso for breach of contract and prayed for the demolition of the building. Mathay was subsequently impleaded as a respondent.

• The lower court ruled in favor of Ortigas. Mathay moved for reconsideration, but he was rebuffed. He filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court judge. The CA ruled in his favor, hence this review on certiorari filed by Ortigas.

• Please take note that two issues where raised by Ortigas when this matter was elevated to the Supreme Court:

◦ W/N the zoning ordinance should be read into the contract between Ortigas and Hermoso; and

◦ W/N Mathay is a real party-in-interest  considering that he is a mere lessee and there is no privity of contract between him and Ortigas.

 

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N Mathay is a real party-in-interest considering that he is a  mere lessee and there is no privity of contract between him and  Ortigas (Note: To complete the picture, here is how the Court resolved

the first issue: Although, as a general rule, laws are to be  applied prospectively, not retroactively, there are exceptions to this, one of which is when the State exercises police power for the common weal. The zoning ordinance issued by the MMDA is an exercise of the State’s police power, and is therefore applicable retroactively. The CA rightful read the provisions of the ordinance into the contract between Ortigas and Hermoso.)

 

HELD & RATIONALE

YES, Mathay is a real party-in-interest.

• First, Mathay is a possessor in the concept of a “holder of the thing” under Art. 525, CC; therefore, he has an interest in the property.

• Second, what Ortigas prayed for is the demolition of the  building erected by Mathay on the property. As the owner of the building, he has a material interest in it, and he obviously stands either to be benefited or injured after the case is decided.

• Lastly, Ortigas impleaded Mathay as a respondent; as such, it can no longer question his standing by virtue of estoppel

Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws (Art.5)

Exception to the exception: (EI)

E = Ex post facto laws

I = Laws that impair obligations of contracts

ORTIGAS & CO. LIMITED VS CA,346 SCRA 748

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code specifi cally provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, although at the time of the publication of such laws a fi nal sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person shall be deemed a habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crime of serious or less serious physical injuries, Robo, Hurto, Estafa, or falsifi cation, he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener.

Exception to the exception

 

When a statute deals with procedure only, prima facie, it applies to all actions — those which have accrued or pending and future actions. Thus, a law prescribing the form of pleadings will apply to all pleadings fi led after its enactment, although the action is begun before thattime (25 RCL 791).

 

When the law is penal in character and favorable to the accused.

Since curative laws are not within constitutional inhibitions or retrospective legislation impairing the obligation of contracts or disturbing vested rights, statutes of a curative nature which are necessarily retrospective must be given a retrospective operation by the courts (25 RCL 790). The legislature has power to pass healing acts which do not impair the obligations of contracts nor interfere with vested rights. They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or make harmless, is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by previous statutes, it may do so by subsequent ones. If the irregularity consists in doing some act, or doing it in the mode which the legislature might have made immaterial by an express law, it may do so by a subsequent

one (Government v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634). Retroactive operation will more readily be ascribed to legislation that is curative or legalizing than to legislation which may disadvantageously, though legally, affect past relations and transactions (People v. Zeta, L-7140, December 22, 1955).

 

When the law is procedural.

Thus, the Family Code of the Philippines which became effective on August 3, 1988 specially provides in Article 256 thereof that the said code “shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

When the law is curative or remedial.

 

What are the kinds of laws which allow retroactive application? (PPUT NICE) (Art. 4)

 

P = Procedural or remedial laws

P = Penal laws favourable to the accused

U = Unless it is otherwise provided

T = Tax laws which expressly declared or is clearly the legislative intent

N = New rights (Laws creating new rights)

I = Interpretative statutes

C = Curative or remedial statutes

E = Emergency laws

 

When the law expressly provides for retroactivity.

            Art. 3 Ignorance of law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

1. BOBIS VS BOBIS 336 SCRA 747

Doctrine : Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith

FACTS:

Respondent contracted a first marriage with Maria Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.

 

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of bigamy despite respondent’s claim of ignorance of Article 40 of the Family Code

HELD:

Yes, since ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.

 

2. CONSUNJI VS CA,GR NO. 137873,20 APRIL 2001

Doctrine: Ignorance of Fact 

FACTS:

Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City.  He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

 

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform.  Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.  Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

 

November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC .PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990,10 days after the accomplishment of the form.

 

Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.

 

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

 

D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

 

 

ISSUES:

 

Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits  (ECC) she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

 

 

RULING:

 

The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived their known right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

 

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

 

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.

 

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

 

Prospective Application of Laws (Art.4)

Exceptions to the General Rule

Presumption of Knowledge of the Law (Art.3) The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” solely refers to the fifteen day period and not to the requirement of publication. Publication is an indispensable requisite the absence of which will not render the law effective. If the law provides for a different period shorter or longer than the fi fteen-day period provided by Section 1 of Executive Order No. 200, then such shorter or longer period, as the case may be, will prevail. If the law provides that it shall take effect immediately, it means that it shall take effect immediately after publication with the fifteen-day period being dispensed with.

What are covered under the term “Laws”

Section 1 of Executive Order No. 200 uses the word “laws.” Hence, the effectivity provision refers to all statutes, including those local and private laws (Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446), unless there are special laws providing a different effectivity mechanism for particular statutes

 

People v. Simon234 SCRA 555, 569 (1994)G.R. No. 93028

Facts:

 Accused-appellant Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a NarcoticsCommand (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant Simon should be given a lighter punishment of six months to six years instead of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the amendments of Republic Act No. 7659 to Republic Act No. 6425

Held:

Yes, since Republic Act No. 7659 was effected on December 31, 1993.

Meaning of the Clause “unless it is otherwise provided”

FACTS:

 

Petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

 

The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it “would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved”.

 

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2 “unless otherwise provided”.

 

RULING:

 

 

YES, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

 

 

“Unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become effective.   The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985.  This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens.  Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code “Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith”.  

 

people vs Simon 234 SCRA 555

 

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

 

Tanada vs tuvera 136 SCRA 27(1985)

 

Effectivity of Laws (Art. 2)

 

Article 1. This Act shall be known as the “Civil Code of the Philippines.” RA 386

 

Definition of Civil Code ( according to Tolentino)- Collection of laws which regulate the private relations of the members of civil society, determining their respective rights and obligations, with reference in persons, things and civil acts. Code of Commission with 5 members created by Pres Roxas under EO 48 dated March 20, 1947 January 26, 1949 (passed by Senate and Congress)